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RESPONDENT DR. DAVID OKUBO'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the 
District Court's Order of Dismissal on the basis that petitioners 
failed to establish a prima facia case that Dr. Okubo's conduct was 
a proximate cause of the decedent's injury. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COllRT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5), this court has 
jurisdiction to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision filed on 
March 28, 1990. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The provisions which control the resolution of whether 
petitioner's writ should be granted are Rules 45, 46, 47, and 49 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action. 
Dr. Okubo hereby incorporates by reference Dr. Nickolfs 
description of the "Nature of the Action" found on p. 2 & 3 of Dr. 
Nickol's brief. Like counsel for Dr. Nickol, counsel for Dr. Okubo 
received petitioners1 Writ of Certiorari on June 5, 1990. The 
petition was unsigned and the certificate of service was neither 
dated nor signed. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Plaintiff, Tiffany Ruth Butterfield ("Tiffany"), was 
born June 30, 1984. Defendant David Okubo ("Dr. Okubo") examined 
Tiffany as part of a routine pediatric assessment shortly following 
her birth. At the time of the examination, Tiffany was healthy and 
normal and did not exhibit any abnormal breathing patterns. 
2. On July 4, four days after her birth, Tiffany was taken 
to the Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital Emergency Clinic. The 
emergency chart, recorded at the time of that visit, indicated that 
Tiffany was experiencing decreased activity accompanied with 
congestion in the nose which was improved with bulb suctioning. 
-2-
Defendant Thomas Nickol ("Dr. Nickol") examined plaintiff at that 
time and again assessed the child as normal.. 
3. Tiffany's first and only visit to Dr. Okubo's office 
occurred on July 16, 1984. (Deposition of Angela Butterfield, at 
fH 20, 23 and 24, attached as Addendum "A". See also Transcript of 
December 23, 1987 hearing, p. 7, line 9.) 
4. During the July 16 visit, Dr. Okubo obtained a history 
from Mrs. Butterfield and examined the child. His office notes 
indicate that Tiffany had some history of "gasps" without any skin 
discoloration or reflux. Dr. Okubofs notes also indicate that 
Tiffany had an active, demanding temperament. Tiffany did not 
exhibit any "gasps" during her visit with Dr. Okubo. 
5. The Butterfields sought the services of another 
physician following the July 16 visit with Dr. Okubo. Dr. Okubo 
never saw Tiffany again and never conferred with the Butterfields 
after the July 16 visit. See Transcript of December 23, 1987 
hearing, p. 7, line 11. The Butterfields ha^ d decided shortly after 
the July 16 visit that Dr. Okubo would jio longer be Tiffany's 
pediatrician. (Addendum "A".) 
6. One month after the July 16 visit, on August 16, 1984, 
Tiffany was again taken to the emergency room of Jordan Valley 
Hospital. She was again examined by Dr. Nickol. The Butterfields 
reported to Dr. Nickol that Tiffany was experiencing an irregular 
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breathing pattern with one occasion on which Tiffany did not 
breathe for four seconds, although no skin discoloration was noted 
on that occasion. (See Addendum "B" of Nickol Brief.) Dr. Nickol 
assessed the child as normal for her age and suggested to the 
parents that they watch the child carefully to observe any 
increased respiratory distress with cyanosis or blue discoloration. 
Dr. Nickol suggested to the Butterfields that Tiffany be taken back 
to Dr. Okubo in the latter part of August or September for a two-
month checkup. The Butterfields did not go back to Dr. Okubo. 
7. On August 31, 1984, the Butterfields took plaintiff to 
Dr. Monty McClellan ("Dr. McClellan11), a family practitioner, for 
a routine checkup. Dr. McClellan again saw Tiffany on September 
27, November 5, November 30, and December 14, 1984. (Deposition of 
Monty McClellan, ItH 7-11, attached hereto as Addendum "B".) 
8. On December 20, Tiffany died from sudden infant death 
syndrome while at home. From the time of Dr. Okubofs last contact 
with Tiffany on July 16 and her death on December 20, over five 
months had elapsed. 
9. On December 10, 1987, Dr. Okubo moved for summary 
judgment against plaintiffs. (R. Hit 166-125.) On January 27, 
1988, the trial court granted Dr. Okubo1s summary judgment motion, 
as well as the summary judgment motions filed by the other 
defendants, ruling, inter alia, that the Butterfields had not 
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established, through competent testimony, that the acts of the 
defendants were the proximate cause of Tiffany's death. (R. fH 
206-206.) 
10. On January 26, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals heard 
oral argument on petitioners appeal from the lower court•s order 
granting summary judgment. The court affirmed the lower court's 
decision on March 28, 1990. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
IS UNTIMELY AND SHOULD BE DENIED 
Dr. Nickol already argues in his opposition brief that the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied because it was 
filed in violation of this court's order granting petitioner's 
Motion for Enlargement of Time and requiring that the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari be filed on May 28, 1990. Dr. Okubo hereby 
incorporates by reference Point I of Dr. Nickol's brief (p. 8 and 
9) as if fully set forth herein. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL ON THE BASIS THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
THAT DR. OKUBO'S CONDUCT PROXIMATELY CAUSED TIFFANY BUTTERFIELD'S 
DEATH, GIVEN THE FIVE MONTH INTERVAL BETWEEN DR. OKUBO'S 
LAST CONTACT WITH TIFFANY AND THE FACT THAT ANOTHER PHYSICIAN 
HAD ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HER CARE 
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Introduction 
Dr. Okubo hereby incorporates by reference the entirety of 
"Point III" of Dr. Nickolfs brief in opposition to the Petition for 
Certiorari, p. 11-16. Dr. Nickol offers much explanation of the 
proximate causation issue which is proper and correct. The 
following portion of Dr. Okubofs brief is intended to supplement 
the analysis found in Point III in Dr. Nickol!s brief. Dr. Okubo 
sufficiently raised the issue of proximate causation at the trial 
level for reasons quite similar to those set forth in the Nickol 
brief - the affidavit of Dr. Okubofs own expert, Dr. Dennis W. 
Nielson, presented the trial court with facts upon which to 
conclude that the Butterfields had not sufficiently alleged the 
proximate causation. (Dr. Nielson1s Affidavit is attached as 
Addendum "C".) 
A. Dr. Jacobs Failed to Allege Specific Facts to 
Support his Allegation of Proximate Causation. 
Counsel for Dr. Okubo has been unable to find a medical 
malpractice case from any jurisdiction where a plaintiff 
successfully resisted a motion for summary judgment by submitting 
an opposing affidavit which makes only a conclusory allegation of 
proximate causation without specific facts or competent proof. 
In Utah, affidavits which seek to resist motions for 
summary judgment must state specific facts. The requirement is 
stated as follows: 
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavit or otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. [Emphasis added.] 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. An identical 
requirement is found in almost all jurisdictions. 
An affidavit which merely reflects the affiant's 
unsubstantiated conclusions and which fails to state evidentiary 
facts is insufficient to create an issue of fact. Webster v. Sill, 
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation 
Corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973). 
Not only must a medical malpractice plaintiff show a breach 
of the applicable standard of care with "specific facts", he must 
also set forth proximate causation with "specific facts" in order 
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. While the Court of 
Appeals found that Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit does sufficiently allege 
a breach of the applicable standard of care, it found that the 
affidavit does not allege with specific facts a proximate causal 
connection between Dr. Okubofs conduct and Tiffany Butterfield's 
death. That finding is correct. The affidavit does not even 
attempt to allege, let alone explain with specific facts, that Dr. 
Okubo's conduct, during a well baby visit when Tiffany was not 
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experiencing breathing problems, "caused" Tiffany's death. 
Perhaps the best Utah case to directly confront the 
"specific facts" requirement as it pertains to proximate causation 
is Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985). 
There, dependents of a hotel guest who was murdered in his room 
brought an action for wrongful death against the hotel, alleging 
that the hotel was negligent in providing adequate hotel security. 
This court accepted the proposition in Mitchell that the plaintiffs 
had "ellicited sufficient evidence through the published 
depositions to raise material issues of fact with respect to 
whether the defendants were negligent in providing adequate hotel 
security." Id. at 245. Despite overwhelming evidence of 
negligence, this court nevertheless affirmed summary judgment for 
the hotel because of the plaintifffs failure to establish a 
proximate causal connection between the hotel's negligence and the 
decedent's death: 
It was plaintiff's burden to show the 
defendant's conduct was a substantial causative 
factor that lead to Mitchell's death. The fact 
that the instrumentality which produced the injury 
and subsequent death was the criminal conduct of 
the third person would not preclude a finding of 
proximate cause if the intervening agency was 
itself a foreseeable act. 
* * * 
However, in this case there is no direct 
evidence linking Mitchell's death with the alleged 
inadequate security measures at the Hilton. There 
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is no direct evidence of any kind as to how or 
where the murderer first encountered Mitchell. 
Similarly, there is no direct evidence as to how 
the murderer entered Mitchellfs room or whether he 
had a prior relationship with Mitchell. 
* * * 
Any supposition, therefore, as to the 
manner of entrance to Mitchell f$ room or the 
identity of the assailant would be totally 
speculative. A jury cannot be permitted to engage 
in such speculation. 
Id. at 246. 
The application of Mitchell to thiis case is clear. There 
is no direct evidence in Dr. Jacob's affidavit, or anywhere else, 
to suggest how Dr. Okubofs treatment of Tiffany Butterfield 
resulted in her death over five months later. To permit the 
petitioners to go to trial with the suggestion that Dr. Okubo may 
have contributed to the petitioner's injury would be to invite 
precisely the speculation warned against ift Mitchell. 
It is not inherently inconsistent for the Court of Appeals 
to conclude that Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit may adequately allege that 
Dr. Okubo breached the applicable standard of care and, at the same 
time, to find that the affidavit lacks specific facts to establish 
proximate cause. In Bennion v. LeGrand-Johnson Const. Co., 701 
P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), buyers brought an action against the 
supplier of some allegedly defective concrete. The jury found for 
the plaintiff. They agreed in response to one interrogatory that 
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the plaintiffs themselves were "negligent", but found that their 
negligence was not a "proximate cause" of their damages. The 
Supreme Court concluded, on appeal, that there is no inherent 
inconsistency in a finding that a party is both negligent but not 
the "proximate cause" of an injury: 
Proximate cause is a legal construct calling for a 
legal conclusion based on various factors in 
addition to an actual cause-effect relationship. 
It is commonplace in the law that an act, 
omission, or force may be an actual cciuse, but not 
a proximate cause. Since the jury may well have 
so found, we cannot conclude that there is an 
irreconcilable inconsistency. 
Id. at 1083. 
In Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah 
App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals reasserted the principal that 
a medical malpractice plaintiff may not successfully resist a 
motion for summary judgment without competent, specific evidence to 
oppose the motion. The court affirmed summary judgment for a 
physician after finding that the physician could not be held liable 
for the negligent treatment of a patient. The patient had 
developed a skin disorder as a result of medications prescribed by 
the physician for epileptic seizures. The court found that there 
was no sworn evidentiary material to controvert the defendant's 
expert opinion that his treatment of the patient, including his 
choice medications and dosages, complied with the applicable 
standard of care. 
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Reeves is a significant case because the Court of Appeals 
reversed summary judgment for the pharmaceutical manufacturers -
concluding, in essence, that the manufacturers may have been 
negligent, but that a doctor who prescribes their drugs, without 
knowledge of the danger, will not be negligent. In a sense, Reeves 
is the opposite of this case. causation was sufficiently 
established to resist summary judgment. Breach of the applicable 
standard of care for the physician in question was not established. 
Reeves illustrates the importance of finding both principals. 
B. The Great Majority of Jurisdictions Would 
Uphold the Court of Appeals. 
Most courts would agree with the Court of Appeals that a 
dismissal of the petitioners1 case was proper based on their 
failure to establish that Dr. Okubo's conduct proximately caused 
their injury. It is entirely appropriate to prevent a medical 
malpractice plaintiff from presenting his case to a jury where 
there is inadequate proof that the defendant physician's conduct 
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Harvey v. Fridley 
Medical Center, P.A., 315 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. 1982). In Harvey, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a directed verdict for a physician 
based on the plaintiff's failure to prove proximate causation. The 
plaintiff had presented himself to the defendant surgeon for the 
removal of a foreign object in his shoulder, the existence of which 
had been confirmed by x-rays. The surgeon failed to examine the x-
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rays before commencing surgery and was unable to locate the object. 
Several months later, a different surgeon located the object (a 
shard of glass) and removed it. Notwithstanding the fact that a 
physician had expressed the opinion that a surgeon exercising due 
care would review x-rays before proceeding with surgery, the 
Minnesota Court upheld a directed verdict in favor of the surgeon. 
The court based its conclusion on that fact that the plaintiff had 
presented inadequate proof of proximate causation because he had 
failed to prove that an analysis of the x-ray would have guaranteed 
the success of the initial operation. 
It is particularly appropriate to prevent a medical 
malpractice action from going to a jury where, as here, the 
proximate causation question is clouded by the fact that the 
defendant physician could not foresee the negligence of other 
physicians who subsequently treat the plaintiff. Thompson v. 
Presbyterian Hosp., Inc. 652 P.2d 260 (Okl. 1982). In Thompson, 
the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against, among 
others, a surgeon and an anesthesiologist for injuries his wife 
received as a result of the administration of anesthesia. Prior to 
surgery, the surgeon had consented to the administration of Demerol 
to the plaintiff's decedent. Later, the anesthesiologist 
administered a "saddle block" spinal anesthetic. The plaintiff's 
theory was that his decedent suffered damages as a result of the 
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synergistic effect of the combined administration of Demerol and 
the saddle block, complicated by the anesthesiologist's failure to 
properly monitor the decedent during the surgery. 
The trial court sustained a demurer interposed by the 
surgeon. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the 
decedent's injuries could not have happened except for the 
supervening negligence of the anesthesiologist. The court 
acknowledged that there was testimony by the plaintiff's medical 
expert that the surgeon's act of prescribing Demerol prior to 
surgery was a deviation from the applicable standard of care. 
Nevertheless, the Thompson court focused on the absence of a 
proximate causal link between the surgeon's actions and the 
decendent's inj ury: 
Negligence is not actionable unless it proximately 
caused the harm for which liability is sought to 
be imposed. Failure to establish that defendant's 
[the surgeons'] negligence was the proximate cause 
of the harmful event is fatal to the plaintiff's 
claim. 
* * * 
It would be indeed an invasion of the province 
of the court to allow Dr. G.'s [plaintiff's 
expert] opinion to pre-empt the proximate cause 
question simply because he believed there was a 
causal link between the surgeon's act of 
prescribing Demerol and the injury sustained. It 
is the court's duty to determine as a matter of 
law whether the evidence is sufficient to show a 
causal connection or whether the intervening 
factors adduced by the proof did break the causal 
nexus between the surgeon's actions and the 
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resulting injury. Dr. G.'s opinion cannot 
dispense with the plaintiff's legal duty to 
establish not only that the Demerol prescription 
was, under the circumstances, a breach of accepted 
medical standards, but also that the patient's 
injurious episode of hypoxia encephalopathy was 
reasonably foreseeable from the surgeon's act of 
prescribing the Demerol. 
The record is barren of proof to the effect that 
the surgeon could [have] reasonably anticipated 
the synergistic effect of Demerol in combination 
with the saddle block would repress the patient's 
breathing. 
Id. at 263-64 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
Thompson strongly suggests that the Court of Appeals should 
be affirmed. Although Dr. Jacobs opines in a very non-specific way 
that Dr. Okubo's care fell below the applicable standards, he fails 
to offer any specific facts to even suggest how that deviation can 
be considered the proximate cause of Tiffany's death five months 
later after five subsequent consultations with Dr. McClellan. The 
absence of proximate causation is particularly obvious when it is 
recalled that Dr. Okubo was only consulted at Tiffany's birth, when 
there was no evidence of breathing problems, and again two weeks 
later. During that interval, Tiffany had been taken to Dr. Nickol 
for breathing problems. When Dr. Okubo saw the child on the second 
time, however, it was for a routine check-up and Dr. Okubo was 
never able to observe the breathing problems directly. Even if 
Tiffany's death was a result of someone's failure to prescribe a 
home apnea monitor to guard against SIDS, it could not have been 
-14-
foreseeable to Dr. Okubo on any of his contacts with the child that 
a home apnea monitor would be necessary. Just as the surgeon in 
Thompson could not foresee the subsequent negligence of the 
anesthegiologist, Dr. Okubo could not foresee that the Butterfields 
would take their child to another physiciah, preventing Dr. Okubo 
from making an ongoing analysis of Tiffany's breathing problems. 
Finally, even assuming that Tiffany might h£ve been saved by a home 
apnea monitor and that the standard of care at the time of her 
death required a treating physician to provide one, Dr. Okubo could 
not foresee that Dr. McClellan would fail to recommend one during 
the course of his four month treatment of Tiffany. 
Other jurisdictions have holdings ^imilar to Thompson. In 
Alabama, the rule in medical malpractice cases is that to find 
liability, "there must be more than a mere possibility, or one 
possibility among others, that the negligence complained of caused 
the injury; there must be evidence that tfhe negligence probably 
caused the injury." Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So.2d 690 (Ala. 
1985) (upholding a directed verdict for a physician in a case 
arising out of the stillborn birth of a child). In Connecticut, a 
medical malpractice plaintiff must prove not only a violation of 
the standard of care, but must also prove a causal relationship 
between the violation and the resulting injury. Grodie v. The 
State Tulin, 365 A.2d 1076 (Conn. 1976). fhe malpractice must be 
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more than a mere incident in a chain of events: 
If the chain of causation of the damage, when 
traced from the beginning to the end, includes an 
act or omission which, even if wrongful or 
negligent, is or becomes of no consequence in the 
results or so trivial as to be a mere incident of 
the operating cause, it is not such a factor as 
will impose liability for those results. Id. at 
1079. (Citation omitted, emphasis added.) 
For a similar holding, see Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 
341 (4th Cir. 1982). In Fitzgerald, a medical malpractice action, 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the causation 
requirement in medical malpractice actions in Virginia is 
characterized by a "but for" rule under which the proximate cause 
of an event is that act or omission which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, 
produces an event, and without which the event would not have 
occurred. Both cause in fact and foreseeability of the injury must 
be present. In a medical malpractice action where there are a 
number of possible causes for the plaintiff's injury, a physician's 
negligence will be regarded as a proximate cause only if the 
evidence is that it is more likely or probable that his negligence 
caused injury than the other possible causes. Certainly, the 
conduct of Dr. Okubo is not, more probably, the cause of Tiffany's 
death than the other possible causes. 
C. The United States Supreme Court Has made it 
Clear That Courts Should Not Strain to Defeat 
Motions for Summary Judgment Where Questions with 
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Respect to a Material Fact Are Not Reasonable. 
It is useful to recall that the United States Supreme Court 
has recently held that summary judgment is not to be regarded as a 
stepchild of the law: 
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded 
not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but 
rather as an integral part of the federal rules as 
a whole, which are designed "to secure the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action." 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed. 2d 
265 at 276 (1986). 
The court in Celotex went on to note: 
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only 
for the rights of the persons asserting claims and 
defenses that are adequately based in fact to have 
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but 
also for the rights of persons opposing such 
claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner 
provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the 
claims and defenses have no factual basis. 
Id. at 276. 
This court is undoubtedly cognizant of the Butterfields1 
interest in a jury trial as it considers this Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. Celotex teaches that the court must also be cognizant 
of Dr. Okubo's interest in resolving a claim which really should 
not go to the jury. The Butterfields had several months to obtain 
competent, clear, unequivocal medical testimony that Dr. Okubo 
breached the applicable standard of care and that that breach 
proximately caused Tiffany's death. They failed to marshall the 
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requisite evidence to resist Dr. Okubo!s motion for summary 
judgment, even after obtaining an extension of time to do so. 
There is no reason to think that the Butterfields have not already 
"taken their best shot" at resisting the motion for summary 
judgment, and it would be unfair to force Dr. Okubo to try his case 
to the jury on the slim hope that the Butterfields could improve 
the caliber of their expert testimony between now and the time of 
trial. The Butterfields had their day for preparation and the 
Jacobs affidavit was the best they could do. 
It is entirely proper for this court to consider the 
ultimate plausibility of the Butterfield1s theory against Dr. Okubo 
when ruling on this motion. Concededly, it is inappropriate for a 
court to resolve factual inferences in favor of one party or 
another when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, but when a 
claim is thoroughly implausible, such as the notion of Dr. Okubofs 
treatment of Tiffany five months before her death contributed to 
her death, the court may properly take notice of such 
implausibility in the factual context of the Butterfield1s claim. 
In a decision handed down in the same year as Celotex, the United 
States Supreme Court stated: 
When the moving party has carried its burden under 
Ruled 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply 
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 
the material facts. In the language of the rule, 
the non-moving party must come forward with 
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
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issue for trial." Where the recbrd taken as a 
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 
find for the non-moving party, there is no 
"genuine issue for trial." 
It follows from these settled principles that if 
the factual context renders respondents1 claim 
implausible—if the claim is one which simply 
makes no economic sense—respondents must come 
forward with more persuasive evidence to support 
their claim than would otherwise be necessary. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 at 552 (1986) ("emphasis in 
original). 
The suggestion that Dr. Okubo should have to endure a jury 
trial "makes no sense", and Matsushita entitles this court to 
consider that fact. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals1 conclusion th^t Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit 
fails to offer "specific facts" to prove a proximate causal 
connection between Dr. Okubo's conduct and Tiffany Butterfield's 
death was correct. The decision should be upheld. 
DATED this *p day of July, 1990. 
STRONG & HANNI 
R. scott willlefiis 
G. Eric Nielson 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
23 
Q It was never raised by ydu? 
A No, because I was told at the hospital she was 
developing a breathing pattern and they made me feel like such 
a fool for taking her in there wheh she quit breathing, that I 
thought I was being foolish to even ask about it. 
Q Did Dr. Okubo ever raise the subject with you of 
SIDS? 
A No, 
Q Did you tell him of the incident that occurred on 
July 4? 
A He was aware of it. They called him from the 
hospital. I called him the next d^y, also. 
Q But did you, at this visit on the 16th, did you 
actually tell him about what had happened? 
A Yes* We discussed it shortly. I mostly discussed 
it with the nurse. 
Q What did he tell you he Relieved the problem was? 
A She was creating a breathing pattern. 
Q And not to worry about itt? 
A Not to worry. 
Q Was that the end of the conversation? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you seen him since that date? 
A July 16? 
Q July 16. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 A No, I haven1t. 
2 Q You didn't take her back in to see him again at all, 
3 then? 
4 A No.. 
5 Q Why not? 
6 A Because I felt he was careless. 
7 Q What caused you to feel that he was careless? 
8 A Because I was in one door and out the other. There 
9 was two doors on the examining room and they ushered you in 
10 one room and out the other, like ai^  assembly line. That's how 
11 I felt. 
12 I Q So you made a conscious decision at that time not to 
13 go back and see him? 
14 A Yes, I was going to look for another physician. 
15 Q And did you? 
16 A I found one — yeah, I looked and I found another -
17 physician at the end of August. 
18 Q Who was that? 
19 A Dr. McClellan. 
20 Q I guess 'the next date th^t really comes up with 
21 regard to July is the July 4 incident; is that correct? You 
22 said that you told Dr. Okubo about the breathing problem on 
23 July 4? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Tell us what happened on July 4. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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& I understand that you! did see Tiffany Butter field. 
You are referring to your office records now, I assume. 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
kind of h 
A. 
ft 
provided 
A-
eighteen 
Yes, I am. 
Could you tell me wheh you first saw her? 
I first saw her on August the 31st, 1984. 
When you saw her, did her mother give you any 
istory? 
Normally you always t^ke a history. 
Can you tell me, then J what history you were 
with at that time? 
That she was a normal birth, seven pounds, 
and a half-inch baby, t hat had no difficulty 
with pregnancy, that the chief domplaint at that time 
was she had a rash, or she had a whitish material on 
the inside of her mouth, and that was a thrush and that 
was treated. 
ft Did she mention at thi£ time any apnea or problems 
with breathing? 
A. 
ft 
the rash? 
A. 
ft 
up or did 
A. 
No. 
Did she mention any problems at all besides 
No. 
Did you then schedule just a routine follow 
she call the next time she was to visit you? 
I would have normally scheduled a follow up. 
7. 
M l . •• II . 1 1 1 • 1 • . 1 1 1 1 1 1 | . 1 1 . i 
1 I don't recall whether I asked her to return specifically 
2 or whether that was her own i£ea, but I normally would 
3 have asked her to come back aid then to start her 
4 immunization schedule. 
5 Q. Did she report on this first visit any complaint 
6 of listlessness? 
7 A. No. 
8 ft In Tiffany? 
9 k No. 
10 0 Or congestion? 
11 k No. 
12 Q. What were your impressions, if you can remember? 
13 A. Just that she was a healthy baby and she had 
14 oral thrush. 
15 Q. When you saw her the next time, can you tell 
16 us the date and what your findings were. 
17 A. It was 9-27-84. Basically it was the same 
18 thing, it was normal well baby examination. Her head, 
19 ears, nose, eyes and throat wede within normal limits. 
I 
20 Fontanel was normal, the tear ducts were open, the yeast 
21 infection, intraorally was recovering with the microstatin 
22 I had given her. Her chest was clear, normal sinus rhythm. 
23 No abdominal masses, umbilicus Was healed. No hernia, 
24 no hip click. Feet were normal. DPT and oral polio 
25 were given that day and she was scheduled for return 
8. 
at two months. 
Q. At this time was it y^ur understanding that 
you were this child's primary physician? 
A. As far as I knew, 
Q. Was it your understanding that she was seeing 
you exclusively or did you know whether she was seeing 
other physicians, or did you know either way? 
A. I don't recall, honestly. 
Q. Do you recall on this second office visit having 
any discussions regarding apnea* congestion? 
A. She didn't relate that the child was having 
any difficulties like that. 
Q. I won't go into the specific office visits. 
I also have a copy of your records but I did want to 
ask you a couple of questions at}out it. 
Were you also seeing the mother at this time 
as a patient? 
A. Yes, I believe I was. 
Q. Do you recall seeing Wer in the emergency room 
during the same* period of time? 
A. It would have been abolut the same period of 
time but I don't have my records in front of me. I can't 
tell you exactly which date. 
Q. You don't have the recbrds for the mother? 
A. Well, that wasn't what we were supposed to 
9. 
1 talk about today. I thought it was just about Tiffany 
2 and so— 
3 Q. Those are the only records you have? 
4 A. I could get them but, I haven't reviewed them 
5 op anything like that so— 
6 Q. We will stick with Tiffany just to stay sequential) 
7 then, and then we could talk about the mother more later. 
8 A. Okay. 
9 (J So your understanding, then, you saw the child 
10 six times; is that correct? 
11 A. Actually I believe I saw the child— 
T2 Q. Five. Excuse me. 
13 A. Five times. 
14 Q. Because the December 22nd visit was just with 
15 the mother? 
16 A. Yes, it was. 
17 Q. And during these fivQ visits from August until 
18 December, did the mother mention anything to you about 
19 problems with breathing, or problems with congestion, 
20 or listlessness, discoloration; any of those things? 
21 A. Yes, on one occasion. I'm sorry. Two occasions 
22 She told me on November the 5th that the child had been 
23 having some mucus in her nose and that was treated. 
24 I thought she had a berous otitis media and 
25 when I saw her back on the 30th that had resolved. 
10. 
1 I did see her again oh the 14th of December 
2 and she related that the child had mucus in her upper 
3 respiratory tract. The previous treatment had been effective 
4 so I reinstituted it, and then t did not see her after 
5 that. 
6 Q. Could you tell me frotti your notes on the 14th 
7 what was the previous treatment? The Rondec? 
8 A. Rondec, DM. 
9 Q. And so you continued it because— 
10 A. It recurred. 
11 ft It recurred. Because it had resolved it by 
12 the 30th? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And could you explain to me what SOM is again? 
15 A. Serous otitis media. 
16 Q. And what is that? 
17 A. That is where you have fluid behind the ear 
18 but it is not of an infectious nature. 
19 Q. And was the condition (complained of on the 
20 14th the same thing; SOM, or was it something different? 
21 A. No. That was what she had on that one occasion 
22 on the 5th of November and on ttife 14th of December that 
23 was not present. 
24 Q. And the complaint of the 14th was just— 
25 A. That the mucus was present in her nose. 
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1 than the records? 
2 A. No, sir. 
3 Q. And the information given to you by the parents? 
4 A. No, sir. 
5 Q. Okay. Let me ask on£ more thing. I am hazy 
6 on this whole deal. Have you been retained as an expert 
7 witness to testify for Mr. Grihdstaff? 
8 k Not'that I know of. 
9 ft Has he asked you to testify in court in this 
10 matter? 
11 MR. GRINDSTAFF: I have never talked to him. 
12 THE WITNESS: I have never met him before or talked 
13 to him on the phone, and so, no, I have not been retained 
14 as an expert in the case. 
15 Q. (By Mr. Garner) And so have the plaintiffs 
16 asked you to testify in their behalf? 
17 A. They asked if I would be willing to do that 
18 and I said, f,Why don't you see how the case goes along 
19 for you, and this might be something that is going to 
20 be settled out.of court. If absolutely necessary, yes, 
21 I will, but letfs not cross bridges before—" 
22 MR. GARNER: I think that is all I have. 
23 MRS. BRENNAN: I have a couple more. 
24 EXAMINATION 
25 BY MRS. BRENNAN: Q. Are you still seeing Mrs. Butter-
47. 
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NIELkON, M.D., PH.D. 
CivifL No. C86-9250 
Judg£ Richard Moffatt 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on 
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH 
BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiffs, 
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DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL, 
fcnd HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Dennis W. Nielson, M.D., Ph.D*, being first duly sworn 
On oath deposes and states: 
1. J am a physician licensed to practice in the State 
of Utah, having a specialty in pediatric medicine. I am 
a board certified pediatrician and.am presently an assistant 
professor of pediatrics at the Department of Pediatrics at 
the University of Utah Medical Center. Of particular interest 
oooorr oo 
to this case involving a claimed sudden infant death syndrome, 
I am board certified in pediatric pulihonology a»d am presently 
the director of the Pediatric Pulmonary Function Laboratory 
at the University of Utah Hospital and Primary Children's 
Medical Center. I am also a member of the Sudden Infant 
Death Advisory Council of the Utah State Department of Health. 
A complete summary of my expertise and qualifications is 
included within the attached Curriculum Vitae to this affidavit. 
2. At the request of counsel for Dr. David Okubo, I 
have reviewed the medical records of the deceased infant, 
Tiffany Ruth Butterfield, and the depositions of Albert John 
and Angela Butterfield. 
3. That I am familiar with the standard of care required 
of a pediatrician for treatment of the symptoms as reported 
to Dr. Nickol and Dr. Okubo by the plaintiffs on July 4, 
and July 16, 1984. 
4. That after a thorough review of the medical records 
and the depositions involved in this case I am of the opinion 
that Dr. Okubo did not deviate from the standard of care 
required of him in the treatment rendered to the deceased 
infant through July 16, 1984. 
5. More specifically, even if Dr. Okubo was told by 
Mrs. Butterfield of the incident that allegedly occurred 
on July 4, 1984, and that was referred to in her deposition, 
I am still of the opinion that Dr. Okiibo would not have been 
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required to order or suggest a home mohitor, assuming as 
plaintiff has testified that there had only been the one 
incident prior to seeing Dr. Okubo and that the child was 
breathing normally and appeared healthy when finally presented 
to the emergency room on July 4, 1984, and also when presented 
to Dr. Okubo on July 16, 1984. Although some physicians 
may choose to order a home monitor for circumstances similar 
to what the plaintiffs reported occurred on July 4f 1984, 
the standard of care would clearly not have required Dr. 
Okubo to order one or refer the patient to another physician 
who would do so. 
6. In addition, even if Dr. Okubq had ordered a home 
monitor there is insufficient data or literature available 
to conclude with medical probability that it would have prevented 
this particular infant's death. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
DATED this lQ1^ day of December, 11987. 
4^wvp LA J f (uJh*** 
Dennis W. N i e l s o n , M.D., Ph.D. 
Subscribed and sworn t o be fore me t h i s lQth day of December, 
1987. 
Notary Pub l i c - Res id ing a t : 
Leona K. Hollingsworth / / 
Bountiful, pT v / 
My Commission Expires: 
April 25. 1991. 
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